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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4776 
___________ 
 
JUSTIN MICHAEL CREDICO, 
 
               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C.O.  GUTHRIE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; 
C.O.  ENGLISH, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; 
CEO OF MATHEW BENDER AND COMPANY INC., 
A MEMBER OF THE LEXIS NEXIS GROUP, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-04476) 
District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2014 
Before:  CHAGARES, GARTH and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 25, 2014) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant, Justin Credico, appeals from the order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania summarily dismissing his civil 
rights action.  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 While incarcerated at the Chester County Prison, Credico filed a complaint under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which he sought to proceed with in forma pauperis pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1915.  He named Correctional Officers Guthrie and English, as well as the 
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the Matthew Bender Company.  Credico alleged that 
the Correctional Officers interfered with his right to access the courts.  In particular, 
Credico stated that back in December 2012, Officer English directed a counselor to 
confiscate certain case-related materials that Credico had requested from the law 
librarian, and that on one occasion in July 2013, Officer Guthrie cut short his time in the 
law library.  He further alleged that the CEO of the Matthew Bender Company failed to 
warn prison officials of the “illegalities” of confiscating a prisoner’s case law, thereby 
causing a breach of contract and the “Lexis Nexis Master Agreement.”  See Compl. at 3, 
¶ III. 
 The District Court granted Credico in forma pauperis status and screened the 
complaint for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  The District Court concluded that the 
complaint was subject to summary dismissal.  The District Court dismissed the complaint 
against the CEO of the Matthew Bender Company because Credico made no allegations 
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in his complaint which would allow the court to find that the CEO was a state actor.  See 
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
With respect to Officers Guthrie and English, the District Court determined that, 
while prisoners retain the right to access the courts to pursue challenges to their sentences 
and to conditions of their confinement, Credico’s complaint failed to show that the 
actions of the Correctional Officers caused him to suffer actual harm to his litigation 
efforts or that he has no other remedy to compensate him for any lost claims.  See 
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  Further, having concluded that 
amendment would be futile, the District Court refused to afford Credico an opportunity to 
amend the complaint.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 
2002).   This appeal followed. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2).  Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  The legal standard for dismissing a 
complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for 
dismissing a complaint pursuant to a motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  See id.  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
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 Upon careful consideration, we agree with the District Court’s assessment of 
Credico’s complaint, and we will affirm for substantially the reasons stated in the District 
Court’s opinion.  Credico did not set forth allegations that would allow for the conclusion 
that the CEO of the Matthew Bender Company was a state actor.  See West, 487 U.S. at 
48 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)).  Additionally, as the District 
Court correctly noted, an inmate raising an access to the courts claim must show that the 
denial of access caused him to suffer an actual injury.  See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
351 (1996). An actual injury occurs when the prisoner is prevented from or has lost the 
opportunity to pursue a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim.  See Christopher v. 
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).  After reviewing the complaint, we agree with the 
District Court that Credico failed to sufficiently allege an access to the courts claim.  
Specifically, he failed to identify an “actual injury” that he has suffered as a result of the 
alleged confiscation of his case-related research or the single instance in which his law 
library time was cut short. 
 In his appellate brief, Credico contends that the District Court “failed to grasp” 
that he was also attempting to assert a retaliation claim against the Correctional Officers.  
Even with the liberal construction afforded a pro se litigant, we cannot conclude that the 
District Court erred in failing to extract a retaliation claim from Credico’s complaint 
given the allegations set forth therein.  Moreover, in light of the nature of the factual 
allegations set forth in Credico’s complaint, we further find no abuse of discretion on the 
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part of the District Court in determining that allowing him leave to amend his complaint 
would have been futile.  See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. 
 As we discern no error in the District Court’s summary dismissal of Credico’s 
complaint, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
